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A Proposal for Direct, Deductible
Charitable Contributions
Joel S. Newman*
I.

Introduction
Charity when it gets personalized . . . is not "charity" any

more, but a real human interest in the family. Americans need
the personal touch. A great many people who will turn down an
appeal for a charity would respond generously to an appeal for a
family.'
I feel better giving 25 cents to a beggar. I feel sorry for him. I
feel more uplifted giving him 25 cents than giving 25 dollars to
some impersonal organization.'
It is evening on the last day of the month. The bills are paid.
There is food in the house. You get paid again tomorrow. You have
one hundred dollars left. Do you give it to the United Way, or do
you go downtown and give it to a homeless person?
The United Way is safe and solid. Of course, that huge group of
charities under the United Way umbrella may include some you do
not like.3 On the other hand, the United Way might well be so conservative that some organizations to which you might have been especially attracted are excluded." However, it does eliminate the bewildering array of worthwhile charities beseeching your help. Giving
to the United Way is almost like giving to all of them.
But the United Way lacks the personal element-the immediate
gratification you get from giving your money directly to a human
being in need and seeing the happiness in his or her eyes. Why do
* Professor of Law, Wake Forest University; A.B., Brown University; J.D., University of
Chicago.
1. Statement of Ellen Buttrick, in F. EMERSON ANDREwS. ATTITUDES TOWARD GIVING
19 (1953).
2. Statement of Arthur Ackerman, in F. EMERSON ANDREWS, ATTITUDES TOWARD GivING 73 (1953).
3. In Winn v. Commissioner, 595 F.2d 1060 (5th Cir. 1979), the taxpayer gave money
to a fund earmarked for a missionary rather than giving his money to the church because he
knew that some of the general funds contributed to the church would go to the World Council
of Churches to which he objected. Id. at 1065.
4. See David Horton Smith, The Role of the United Way in Philanthropy, in 2 COMMISSION ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLIC NEEDS, RESEARCH PAPERS 1353, 1373-75
(1977).
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you think that the United Way television commercials spend so

much time showing you the specific, individual people who benefit
from United Way disbursements? They do so because that personal
connection, if they can make it, will inspire people to give more. Television commercials notwithstanding, giving to the United Way,
when contrasted to giving to an individual in need, is similar to paying taxes.5 Many people would find considerably more pleasure in
giving that hundred dollars to a homeless person--to an individual in
need, rather than to an impersonal charitable organization.

We know that the government wants to encourage charitable6

giving. If not, charitable contributions would not be tax deductible.
If the government wants to encourage charitable giving, would it not
make sense to encourage the broadest possible range of charitable
giving? That way, people who were not inclined to give in one way
might well be inclined to give in another way. At the very least, it
makes very little sense to put obstacles in the path of a form of charitable giving that is very gratifying to a large number of peopie-direct gifts to individuals.
In fact, only contributions to charitable organizations are tax

5. Contributing to the United Way is similar to paying taxes in another sense. Both
involve coercion. The bulk of United Way contributions are obtained through company pressure on their employees. Id. at 1356. See generally Laura S. Stepp, Focus on Self Has
Changed Language of Sacrifice; Charitable Groups Report Attitudes of Giving to Feel Good,
Not Giving Until It Hurts, WASH. POST, March 24, 1991, at A20.
6. I.R.C § 170. It is conceded that this is an overstatement. The government does not
encourage unlimited charitable giving. For example, § 170(b) provides for percentage limitations and § 170(e) limits contributions of appreciated property. Moreover, in this economy, the
government cannot afford significant increases in charitable giving, although otherwise desirable, since they would reduce tax revenues and enlarge the deficit. However, neither the statutory limitations on charitable deductions nor current budgetary cor.straints take away from the
essential point that it is, and should be, in the interest of the government to encourage charitable giving.
In resting the discussion on the premise that the charitable contributions deduction is a
subsidy to encourage charitable giving, other theories are given short shrift. See, e.g., Mark P.
Gergen, The Case for a Charitable Contribution Deduction, 74 VA. L. REV. 1393 (1988).
First, even those who espouse alternative theories would agree that the deduction functions
significantly as a subsidy for charitable giving. Id. at 1396. Second, the considerations that
drive many of the other theories are also effectively addressed by the proposals made here. For
example, some theories hold that the tax base should be that income which is actually used for
personal consumption. See the definitions of "standard of living" income and consumption in
DAVID F. BRADFORD ET AL., BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIc TAX REFORM 30-31 (1984). Charitable
contributions should be deducted since they are consumed by someone else. William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV. 309, 346 (1972).
However, they should not be deducted if the charitable contribution is a disguise for the taxpayer's own consumption. Peter J. Wiedenbeck, Charitable Contributions: A Policy Perspective, 50 Mo. L. REV. 85, 87-91 (1985). Contributions such as the ones espoused here would
pass that test as well. It is submitted that at least Proposal One would have sufficient safeguards against disguised personal consumption. See infra text p. 227.
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deductible; those to individuals, however needy, are not.' Moreover,
it does not matter that a contribution to a needy individual who is
the intended beneficiary of a charitable organization will thereby
save that organization money.' The contribution must be directly
made to the organization.
Why would a rational government that desired to maximize
contributions to charity choose such a rule? The actual, historical
reasons will be discussed below. However, the two reasons that make
sense involve problems of monitoring and the efficiency of the deduction as a tax expenditure.
It is one thing to give a tax break to a bona fide contributor to a
bona fide charity. It is quite another if either the contributor or the
charity is lying. Charitable contributions must be monitored for the
sake of the government and the donors.' The government cannot
monitor millions of donors and donees, but it can monitor thousands
of certified charitable organizations.10 Arguably, restricting deductible contributions to a finite list of charitable organizations is the only
way that the whole scheme can be administered.
If charitable contributions to individuals were deductible, people
would claim deductions for gifts to the natural, individual objects of
their bounty-their relatives and friends. But what could be wrong
with that, as long as those relatives and friends were truly needy and
the proper objects of charity?" If the government wants to support
people in need, should it matter from whom the support comes?
It matters because of efficiency. The charitable contribution deduction is a tax expenditure.1 2 As such, it is justified if its benefits
7. See infra notes 14-26 and accompanying text; Peter J. Wiedenbeck, Charitable Contributions: A Policy Perspective, 50 Mo. L. REV. 85, 105-08 (1985).
8. Thomason v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 441, 444 (1943); Murray Davenport, P-H Memo
TC 75,369.
9. See Leslie G. Espinoza, Straining the Quality of Mercy: Abandoning the Quest for
Informed Charitable Giving, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 605 (1991).
10. In 1985, there were more than 300,000 charitable organizations. Dean Pappas, The
Independent Sector and the Tax Laws: Defining Charity in an Ideal Democracy, 64 S. CAL. L.
REV. 461 (1991). Some claim that the IRS does not adequately monitor charitable organizations either. The Donee Group Report & Recommendations, in 2 COMMISSION OF PRIVATE
PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLIC NEEDS; RESEARCH PAPERS (1977).
1I. If individuals could receive deductions for contributions, there would be a temptation
for donors to claim that their relatives and friends were deserving subjects of charity even
when they were not. This temptation would exacerbate the administrative burden caused by
the deductibility of contributions to individuals.
12. See generally Stanley S. Surrey & Paul R. McDaniel, The Tax Expenditure Concept and the Budget Reform Act of 1974, 17 B.C. IND. & COMM. L. REv. 679 (1976);
Jonathan B. Forman, Origins of the Tax Expenditure Budget, 30 TAX NOTES 537 (Feb. 10,
1986).
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outweigh its costs. 1 3 However, only those benefits that are purchased
by those costs should count. Therefore, the only benefits to measure
are those contributions to charity that would not 'have been made but
for the tax deduction. By this logic, a deduction is wasted every time
a deduction is taken for a charitable contribution that would have
been made even without the deduction.
Arguably, people would contribute to their :needy relatives, and
perhaps their friends, even if no tax deduction existed. Accordingly,
it would be a waste to allow a charitable deduction for such contributions. Hdwever, if deductible contributions can only be made to
charitable organizations, and the donor cannot tell the organization
what to do with the money, then a donor cannot possibly receive a
charitable contribution deduction for money that will go directly to a
relative or friend. Thus, the potential waste is eliminated.
However, what if a bona fide charitable organization were to
investigate potential individual charitable donees and certify the ones
that were truly in need? If an individual was certified, a donor could
choose a particular individual from this list. After the charitable organization had determined that the donor and the donee were not
related, the donor could contribute directly to the individual. Should
such contributions be deductible?
This scheme would alleviate the legitimate governmental concerns with individual donees. First, there would be no increased monitoring problems. The government would only have to monitor the
charitable organizations. There would be no additional burden because the government presently monitors these organizations. The
charitable organizations themselves would monitor the individual donees in terms of the donee's initial eligibility for charity and the subsequent use of the donated funds. Neither the government nor the
donor would be in danger of being defrauded. Second, the efficiency
problem could be essentially solved if the charitable organization
made sure that donor and donee were not related. Donors could enjoy the additional gratification that comes from direct donations to
individuals, without harm to the government.
This Article will describe the history of the nondeductibility of
donations to individuals and discuss the relevance of recent case law
on earmarked contributions to missionaries. It will then describe the
13. It is generally felt that the charitable contribution is an efficient tax expenditure,
and that charitable contributions are indeed sensitive to tax deductibility. See CHARLES T.
CLOTFELTER. FEDERAL TAX POLICY AND CHARITABLE GIVING (1985) and JERALD ALAN
SCHIFF. CHARITABLE GIVING AND GOVERNMENT POLICY (1990).

DEDUCTIBLE CHARITABLE

CONTRIBUTIONS

operations and tax status of some of the major sponsorship charities,
which promote the feeling, and sometimes the reality, of a direct
contribution to an individual - be it a child or a whale. The Article
will conclude with proposals for two alternative forms for deductible
direct contribution schemes and will explain the advantages and disadvantages of each formula.
II.

Early History

A.

General Case Law

"Charity" connotes a contribution to a public, indefinite donee."' Thus, a contribution to an individual cannot be deductible because it is not even a contribution to "charity" in the first place.
However, this definition of "charity" predates the tax laws by centuries. 15 Whether the definition makes any sense in terms of current
tax law is questionable.1 6
The need for a definition of "charity" originally arose from a
problem with the interpretation of wills and trusts.' 7 When wills
specified that a bequest was to go to "charity," the executors needed
guidance.1 The question was an important one, for the donor was no
longer available, and the executor might have been prone to shade
any necessary interpretation in a self-interested manner. 9 Moreover,
the most likely donees were probably not in a position to protect
their interests.2 °
The concept of public charity was intertwined with love, unselfishness, the public good, and governmental benefit. In a passage
often quoted from a Third Circuit opinion:
Charity, derived from the Latin caritas, originally meant love.
In the thirteenth chapter of first Corinthians the revised version
14. Russell v. Allen, 107 U.S. 163, 167 (1882). "[C]harity begins where certainty in
beneficiaries ends." Thomason v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 441, 443 (1943).
15. See generally Statute of Charitable Uses, 43 Eliz. I c. 4 (1601); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 375 (1957); GARETH H. JONES. HISTORY OF THE LAW OF CHARITY
1532-1827 (1969); P.S. Atiyah, Public Benefit in Charities, 21 MoD. L. REv. 138 (1958);
Laura Brown Chisolm and Dennis R. Young, Introduction: What is Charity?, 39 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 653 (1988); Leslie G. Espinoza, Straining the Quality of Mercy: Abandoning the
Quest for Informed Charitable Giving, 64 S.CAL. L. REV. 605, 636-39 (1991); Kenneth Liles
and Cynthia Blum, Development of the Federal Tax Treatment of Charities, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 6 (1975).
16. Mark A. Hall and John D. Colombo, The Charitable Status of Nonprofit Hospitals:
Toward a Donative Theory of Tax Exemption, 66 WASH. L. REV. 307, 333-40 (1991).
17. JONES, supra note 15, Ch. Ill.
18. JONES, supra note 15, Ch. Ill.
19. JONES, supra note 15, at 20.
20. JONES, surpa note 15, at 20.
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uses the word "love" in defining the third of the three cardinal
virtues, which, in King James' version read "]Faith, Hope and
Charity." It was with similar emphasis on the motive which
prompts action that Mr. Binney framed his approved definition
of a charitable trust in his argument in the Girard will case:
"Whatever is given for the love of God, or the love of your
neighbor, in the catholic and universal sense, given from these
motives and to these ends, free from the stain or taint of every
consideration that is personal, private, or selfish.". . Charity
means such unselfish things as are wont to be done by those who
are animated by the virtue of love. . .Thus the Supreme Court
. . . .has defined a charitable trust as "a gift to a general public
use which extends to the poor as well as to the rich." . . . a

charitable gift to be one "for the benefit of an indefinite number
of persons, either by bringing their minds or hearts under the
influence of education or religion, by relieving their bodies from
disease, suffering or constraint, by assisting them to establish
themselves in life, or by erecting or maintaining- public buildings
or works or otherwise lessening the burdens of government." 2
The definition of "charity" as public charity led to cases that
the courts and the Service could determine easily. James Sprunt Benevolent Trust22 concerned a trust established "for the temporal support of a son or grandson or a blood relation who will be called to
the Gospel Ministry of the Southern Presbyterian Church.12 3 The
Board of Tax Appeals held that the charitable purpose was not sufficiently public and denied the tax exemption.2 4
In Dubois,25 the taxpayer formed a corporation organized exclusively for charitable purposes. The corporation distributed money to
charitable corporations.2 6 In addition, it contributed $1800 to the
widow of the taxpayer's brother for board and maintenance, $360 to
the taxpayer's mother's cousin for board and maintenance, and $551
21. Bok v. McCaughn, 42 F.2d 616, 618-19 (3d Cir. 19:0) [citations omitted]. The
quoted passages also suggest, in relating charity to love and unselfishness, that there is a moral
aspect to charity. Should only morally desirable contributions be deductible? If so, would contributions to individuals be nondeductible since they are selfish and hence less morally desirable? First, moral considerations should be irrelevant to a tax regime in a pluralistic society.
See Joel S. Newman, The Deductibility of Nondiscretionary Personal Expenses, 6 AM. J. TAX
POLIcY 211, 228-29 (1987). Second, selfishness is relevant only in efficiency terms-the idea
that selfishness might lead one to contribute even were there no deduction. Of course, in cases
of more measureable selfishness, there would be a quid pro quo that would defeat the
deduction.
22. 20 B.T.A. 19 (1930).
23. Id. at 24.
24. Id. at 27.
25. 31 B.T.A. 239 (1934).
26. Id.
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to the taxpayer's mother's former maid and companion for nursing
and hospital care. 7 The Board of Tax Appeals denied the charitable
deductions for contributions to the corporation because some of its
disbursements had not been for charitable purposes.2 8
In Tilles v. Commissioner,2 9 the taxpayer donated $200 to a
fund to provide for the musical education of Anna Poe, a store clerk
who had shown potential as a musician.3" The court had no trouble
denying the charitable deduction because the contribution was for
the benefit of an individual. 3
In I.T. 3549,2 co-workers organized a trust fund to defray the
medical and travelling expenses of their sick colleague. The Service
ruled that contributions to the fund were nondeductible, relying on
Tilles to support its decision.3 3
In Thomason v. Commissioner,3 4 the taxpayer took in a child
from the Children's Home Society on a trial basis with the understanding that the Society would still be legally obligated for the
child's support.3 5 The taxpayer raised the boy for twelve years and
then returned him to the Society. 6 However, he made a commitment to the Society to continue to pay for the boy's support until he
reached the age of majority. The Tax Court denied a charitable
contribution deduction, commenting that it was not sufficient "that
the sums relieved the Society from some financial burden."3 8
As evidenced by this early case law, it was settled that direct
donations to individuals were gifts and not contributions. Therefore,
these donations were not deductible. 9 There was little left to litigate
except for the occasional issue of precatory language-whether the
donor had irrevocably directed that the donation go to an individual
40
or had merely expressed that desire.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. 38 B.T.A. 545 (1938), affid, 113 F.2d 907 (8th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S.
703 (1940).
30. Id. at 546.
31. Id. at 550-51.
32. 1942-1 C.B. 79.
33. Id. at 80.
34. 2 T.C. 441 (1943).
35. JONES, supra note 15, at 442.
36. JONES, supra note 15, at 442.
37. JONES, supra note 15, at 442.
38. Thomason v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 444, 444 (1943).
39. Gifts are nondeductible to the donor and taxfree to the donee. I.R.C. § 102. However, the motivations for gifts are the same as those for contributions to charity. See Sarah
Marquis v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 695 (1968); James W. Colliton, The Meaning of "Contribution or Gift"for Charitable Contribution Deduction Purposes, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 973 (1980).
40. In Peace v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. I (1964), the taxpayer sent 23 checks to the
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Missionaries

1. General Background.-Missionaries were a special case and
posed various issues that made litigation necessary.4 1 First, missionaries and other religious persons occasionally take vows of poverty.
Such vows led to the issue of whether the missionary was the appro42
priate donee or merely a conduit.

Even without a vow of poverty, missionaries are not ultimate
donees. A scholarship given to a student, medicine given to an invalid, or food given to a hungry person are consumed directly by the
recipient, and the matter is solved. However, the missionaries work
not for themselves, but for their religious organizations. Resources
given to them are used not only by them, or even predominantly by
them, for their own benefit. Instead, they are u;ed to further their

work for the religious organization and thereby for the good of a
larger public.4"

Thus, missionaries might be "agents" of their churches, in a
way that a poor person is not an "agent" of a welfare organization."'
Similarly, even if payments to missionaries are not payments directly
Sudan Interior Mission, writing the names of four individual missionaries on the checks. Id. at
3. The contributions were held deductible, and the court noted that the designations of individual missionaries were merely precatory. Id. at 7. In the same year, in Tripp v. Commissioner,
337 F.2d 432 (7th Cir. 1964), the taxpayer sent money to a college, with an accompanying
note saying that he knew that the contribution would be deductible only if its use were unspecified, but that if it could be applied toward the tuition of one Robert Roble, it would be constructive. Id. at 435. The college posted the money to Roble's tuition account. Id. at 435-36.
The court denied the deduction, noting that the college never awarded Roble a scholarship and
that it came directly from the taxpayer. Id. at 436. It is difficult to reconcile these cases.
41. Davis v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 2014 (1990); Brinley v. Commissioner, 782 F.2d
1326 (5th Cir. 1986); White v. United States, 725 F.2d 1269 (10th Cir. 1984); Winn v. Commissioner, 595 F.2d 1060 (5th Cir. 1979); Smith v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 988 (1973); Peace
v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 1 (1964); David Cook, P-H Memo TC 78,179; Thomas Lesslie, PH Memo TC
77,111; Murray Davenport, P-H Memo TC 75,369; L.F. Ratterman, P-H
Memo TC 48,130.
42. Cox v. Commissioner, 297 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1961). (No estate tax deduction for
bequest to son who had taken a vow of poverty because the language of the bequest was to the
son and no mention of the vow of poverty was made.); L.F. Ratterman, PH-Memo TC
48,130 (holding that donation to taxpayer's son, who was a Jesuit priest and had taken a vow
of poverty, was deductible with virtually no discussion).
43. In White v. United States, 725 F.2d 1269, 1271-72 (10th Cir. 1984), the court distinguished other individual charitable donee cases from mission.ry cases, commenting: "In
most of those cases the contribution served the charitable organization only by eliminating the
need of one possible object of the organization's bounty. A student whose educational or living
expenses are paid by such a contribution is not serving the charitable organization."
44. In Thomas Lesslie, P-H Memo TC 77,111, checks payable to the taxpayer's missionary neighbor were held deductible because the missionary was the agent of a church, a §
501(c)(3) organization. In Brinley v. Commissioner, the Fifth Ci:cuit noted the missionary's
status as an agent of the Church, but commented that such status was much less important
than the control test. 782 F.2d 1326, 1335 (5th Cir. 1986). See infra note 61 for the control
test.
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"to" their churches, they might be indirect payments "for the use
of" the church. 45 Finally, when missionaries pay their food, clothing,
and shelter expenses while away from home"' on a religious mission,
those payments are out-of-pocket expenses incident to charitable
work and are therefore deductible.4 7 Even if another individual paid
those expenses, until the Davis case in 1990,8 at least a colorable
argument could be asserted that those expenses were deductible. 49

Missionaries, therefore, presented special problems and gave rise to
more case law.
2. Mormon Missionaries.-Eventually, most churches arranged for contributions for missionary work to be made directly to
the mother church.5" This system ensured that the contributions
were totally under its control and thereby deductible. However, the

Mormon church did not operate in this manner. For its 25,000 missionaries each year, it computed an annual stipend based upon a frugal missionary lifestyle and asked the missionary's parents to pay the
stipend directly to their child. 51 The missionaries were required to
submit weekly financial reports. 52 However, the church had no formal, legal control over the money. 53 The Mormons had religious and
traditional reasons for their direct contribution scheme.5 4 Direct contributions encouraged commitment and frugality from the missiona45. I.R.C. § 170(c). For discussion of the meaning of the statutory phrase "for the use
of," see Winn v. Commissioner, 595 F.2d 1060 (5th Cir. 1979); Bauer v. United States, 449 F.
Supp. 755 (W.D. La. 1978), affd, 594 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1979); Smith v. Commissioner, 60
T.C. 988 (1973); Thomason v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 441 (1943); Sherman Sampson, P-H
Memo TC 1 82,276; Murray Davenport, P-H Memo TC
75,369; Joel S. Newman, The
Inequitable Tax Treatment of Expenses Incident to Charitable Service, 47 FORDHAM L. REVIEW 139, 148-50 (1978).
46. In Brinley v. Commissioner, 782 F.2d 1326, 1334 (5th Cir. 1986), a missionary was
held to have shifted his tax home from his normal residence to the site of his missionary work.
Therefore, meals and lodging expenses were nondeductible.
47. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-l(g). In Brinley, the court commented:
We agree that deductible donations to a charitable organization must not be
restricted for the benefit of a particular individual ...
A different situation arises, however, where an individual contributes services to a qualified organization.
Brinley, 782 F.2d at 1332. See also Rev. Rul. 58-279, 58-1 C.B. 145; Rockefeller v. Commissioner, 676 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1982); Smith v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 988 (1973); Sherman
Sampson, P-H Memo TC 82,276. See generally Newman, supra note 45.
48. Davis v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 2014 (1990).
49. White v. United States, 725 F.2d 1269, 1271-72 (10th Cir. 1984).
50. Telephone Interview with Nelda Ammous, Office Supervisor, U.S. Relations Department, Assemblies of God Division of Foreign Missions (Jan. 28, 1992).
51. Davis v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 2014 (1990).
52. Id. at 2017.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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ries, preserved the tradition of an unpaid lay missionary, and made
the donors feel more involved with the missionaries' efforts. 5
These Mormon missionary financial arrangements led to three
cases, Brinley v. Commissioner,56 White v. United States,5 7 and Davis v. United States.5 8 Many issues were raised in these cases, including: (1) whether the missionaries were "agents" of the church;
(2) whether the missionaries' tax home shifted 1o the situs of the
missionary work; (3) how contributions "for the use of" the church
were to be defined; and (4) whether an individual other than the
person performing charitable work could receive a deduction for paying the out-of-pocket expenses incident to that work.59
Two tests rose to prominence in those cases. The first was the
"benefit" test-payments were deductible only if the primary beneficiary was the charity and not the donor or the individual donee.60
The second was the "control" test-payments to individual beneficiaries were deductible only if the charity maintained a requisite
amount of control over them. 61
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

White v. United States, 725 F.2d 1269, 1270 (10th Cir. 1984).
782 F.2d 1326 (5th Cir. 1986).
725 F.2d 1269 (10th Cir. 1984).
861 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1989), afld, 495 U.S. 472 (1990).
These three cases have generated extensive commentary. Conrad Teitell, Earmarked

Charitable Gifts, 117

TRUSTS AND ESTATES

439 (1978); Ronald A. Blasi and Richard A.

Denesha, Avoiding Disallowance of Earmarked Charitable Contributions 9 REV. TAX'N INDIV. 160 (1985); J. Martin Burke and Michael K. Friel, Recent Developments in the Income
Taxation of Individuals, 10 REV. TAX'N INDIV. 378 (1986); K.C. Jensen, Tax Deductions for
Payments to Mormon Missionaries, 4 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 115 (1990); Dave N. Stewart et al.,
Hernandez and Davis: Has the U. S. Supreme Court Resolved the Controversy Involving
Charitable Contributions?, 15 REV. TAX'N INDIV. 39 (1991); Note, Does Charity Begin at
Home? Tax Status of Payment to an Individual as a Charitable Deduction, 83 MICH. L. REV.
1428 (1985); David L. Herron, Note, A Tax Deduction for Direct Charitable Transfers: The
Case Against Davis v. United States, 64 WASH. L. REV. 935 (1989); Michael R. Noble, Note,
Earmarked Charitable Contributions: In Search of a Standard, 50 Mo. L. REv. 918 (1985);
Christine O'Connor, Comment, White v. United States: Tenth Circuit Allows Parents 'Charitable Contribution' Deduction for Support Payments Made Directly to Mormon Missionary
Son, 62 DENY. U. L. REV. 331 (1984); Lori A. Tobias, Note, Brinley v. Commissioner: A
Modified Charitable Deduction Standard for Missionary Support Payments, 40 Sw. L.J. 1267
(1987).
60. The Tenth Circuit adopted the benefit test and rejected the control test. White v.
United States, 725 F.2d 1269, 1271 (10th Cir. 1984). Prior cases discussing a benefit test
include: Babilonia v. Commissioner, 681 F.2d 678 (9th Cir. 1982); Oppewal v. Commissioner,
468 F.2d 1000 (1st Cir. 1972); Sheffels v. United States, 264 F. Supp. 85 (E.D. Wash. 1967),
affd, 405 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1969) David Hamilton, P-H Memo TC 79,186. See generally
Newman, supra note 45. For a different sort of benefit analysis, ::ee Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989).
61. The Fifth Circuit approved both the control test and the benefit test as alternative
routes to deductibility. Brinley v. Commissioner, 782 F.2d 1326, 1331, 1334-35 (5th Cir.
1986). For prior case law discussing a control test, see Winn v. Commissioner, 595 F.2d 1060
(5th Cir. 1979); Bauer v. United States, 449 F. Supp. 755 (W.D. Las. 1978), affd, 594 F.2d 44
(5th Cir. 1979); Smith v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 988 (1973); Peace v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.
I (1964); Sherman Sampson, P-H Memo TC 82,276; David Cook, P-H Memo TC 78,179;
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When the Davis case went before the Supreme Court, it was
expected that the Court might give its imprimatur to one of these
tests. However, it declined to do so. It held that "for the use of"
means "in trust for" and nothing more, 2 and that only the individual performing the charitable work can deduct the incidental expenses thereof.8
Since Davis is the only recent Supreme Court opinion on charitable deductions for contributions to individual donees, it is considered the primary authority on this issue. By affirming the Ninth Circuit, the Court confirmed that the beneficiary of a charitable
contribution must be indefinite." However, since the case is limited
to a missionary fact pattern, the opinion sheds little light on the
broader question. The issues that it resolved apply peculiarly to religious missionaries, as opposed to ultimate donees.
Yet, the opinion is significant because it indicates the Court's
concerns with administering the statute and protecting the government from abuse. In commenting on "for the use of," the Court
noted:
Moreover, petitioners' interpretations would tend to undermine
the purpose of § 170 by allowing taxpayers to claim deductions
for funds transferred to children or other relatives for their own
personal use. Because a recipient of donated funds need not have
any legal relationship with a qualified organization, the Service
would face virtually insurmountable administrative difficulties in
verifying that any particular expenditure benefited a qualified
donee. Cf § 170(a)(1). Although there is no suggestion whatsoever in this case that the transferred funds were used for an
improper purpose, it is clear that petitioners' interpretation
would create an opportunity for tax evasion that others might be
eager to exploit."'
As to the question of who must pay the incidental expenses to obtain
the deduction, the Court stated:
Petitioners' interpretation not only strains the language of
the statute, but would also allow manipulation of §1.170A-I (g)
for tax evasion purposes. For example, parents might be tempted
to transfer funds to their children in amounts greater than
Murray Davenport, P-H Memo TC 75,369.
62. Davis v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 2014, 2018-23 (1990).
63. Id. at 2023-24.
64. Id. at 2018. See also Tech. Adv, Mem. 32-141-91 (August 29, 1991) (regarding
estate tax).
65. Davis, 110 S. Ct. at 2023-24.

96

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

WINTER

1992

needed to reimburse reasonable expenses incurring in donating
services to a charity. Parents and children might attempt to
claim a deduction for the same expenditure. Controlling such
abuses would place a heavy administrative burden on the Service, which would not only have to monitor the taxpayer's
records, but also correlate them with the records of the third
party. To the extent petitioners' interpretation lessens the likelihood that claimed charitable contributions actually served a
charitable purpose, it is inconsistent with § 170./6
If the monitoring problems could be solved, and if the burden of the
monitoring could be borne by charitable organizations rather than
the Service, it would seem that the Supreme Court's concerns would
be alleviated.
III.

Sponsorship Organizations

A number of charitable organizations currently achieve a type
of earmarking of contributions through sponsorship schemes. Most
of these organizations cater to the needs of impoverished children,
both in the United States and in other countries. All are tax exempt
organizations to which contributions are fully deductible.6 7 Therefore, they are a good place to start when searching for a way to
obtain the marketing advantages of direct contributions without
harming legitimate governmental interests.
A.

Child Sponsorship

Six organizations sponsor over 1,250,000 children in as many as
forty countries.68 Each donor chooses to sponsor a specific child. 9

66.

Id. (citations omitted),

67.

See infra notes 82, 84 and accompanying text.

68. Pamphlet, Children International, Sponsorship: A Special Kind of Love (1989);
Pamphlet, Christian Children's Fund, Fighting Worldwide Poverty: A Strategy For The 90's
(1990); Pamphlet, Compassion International (1991); Pamphlet, Futures for Children (1990);
Pamphlet, Save the Children, What Sponsoring a Child Can Mean . . . To You and A Child
Who Needs Your Help (1990); Pamphlet, World Vision, An Overview (1989) (all materials on
file at the Dickinson Law Review office).
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No other donor sponsors the same child. 0 The donor can specify the
gender of the child and the area of the world, or the specific country
in which the child resides. 7' Alternatively, the donor can agree to

sponsor a child who lives in the area most in need. 72 The organization then selects a child and sends the donor the child's name, photo-

graph, and a brief description of the child." The donor sends a fixed
contribution, which ranges from twelve to twenty-five dollars a
month. 74 The donor may correspond with the sponsored child and
receives regular reports from the organization as to the child's
progress.

1. Pooling Arrangements.-In four of the organizations,

75

the
donor's contributions are not sent directly either to the child or to
the child's parents. Instead, they are pooled with contributions of
other donors for children in the same community. 76 These pooled
funds are then used by the charitable organization to benefit all of
Organization

# Children Sponsored

# Countries

Children International
Christian Children's
Fund
Compassion International
Futures for Children

150,000
500,000

10
28

150,000
2700

Save the Children
World Vision, Inc.

100,000
404,638 by U.S.
citizens
909,350 Worldwide

27
I (Indian
children
in Ariz. &
N. Mexico)
40
89

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

See
See
See
See
See

supra
supra
supra
supra
supra

note
note
note
note
note

68.
68.
68.
68.
68.

Monthly Contribution
Organization
$12
Children Int'l
21
Christian Children
21*
Compassion Int'l
25
Futures for Children
20
Save the Children
20
World Vision
* Compassion International will also establish a "living sponsorship" arrangement. A
one-time contribution of $4,000 creates an endowment, the interest from which is sufficient to
sponsor one child. When the sponsored child reaches adulthood, the funds are used to sponsor
another child, and so on.
75. Pamphlets for Children International, Christian Children's Fund, Save the Children,
and World Vision (all materials on file at Dickinson Law Review office).
76. Id.
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the children, through schooling, medicine, and community projects.17
In one of the organizations, donors may send extra contributions
to be used for holiday gifts for the sponsored child. 78 However, the
organization does not turn over even these funds to the child. 79 Instead, it pools this money in a separate account and uses it to buy
holiday gifts for all of the children in the community if the funds are
sufficient."' If the funds are insufficient, they are returned to the gen-

eral pooled fund for that community. 1
There can be no doubt that these pooling arrangements are legitimately tax deductible. First, the IRS has ruled that they are legitimate. 2 Second, the money does not go directly to individual donees; the beneficiary is indeed indefinite, and a bona fide charitable
organization spends it for the public good. These pooling arrangements are described with varying degrees of candor in the charitable
organizations' pamphlets and in their submissions to the government.8 a However, they provide at least the appearance of a contribu77. Id.
78. Pamphlet, Children International, Sponsorship: A Special Kind of Love, at 8-9.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Pamphlet, Children International, Sponsorship: A Special Kind of Love, at 8-9; Letter dated to Joel Newman from attorney Thomas R. Willy, attorney for Children International
of 1/24/91.
82. Children International: Determination letter effective January 1, 1971 re Holy Land
Mission (predecessor organization). Christian Children's Fund (Le"ter from IRS District Director to Christian Children's Fund, Form MAR-1861 of 8/9/85); Letter from J. Simonik,
IRS Disclosure Officer, Baltimore, Md., to M. Murphy, Wake Forest Law Library of 6/11 /
91; Save the Children Federation, Inc.: Form 6977 dated July 15., 1964; World Vision, Inc.
(Letter from F. Miraflor, Disclosure Assistant, IRS Los Angeles, to Wake Forest Law School
of 5/14/91).
83. Information to the Public
Children International
Benefits and services are purchased specifically for your individual sponsored
child. In most projects, items such as food, clothing or school supplies can almost
always be bought much more cheaply when purchased in bulk. So, for example,
by pooling sponsorship payments before purchases are made, we are able to give
your child substantially more food for the same amount of money than if his
family had bought it themselves.
Where appropriate, other projects are implemented that, in addition to directly benefiting your child, also benefit the neighborhood. ...
Pamphlet, Children International, Sponsorship: A Special Kind of Love, at 4-5.
Q. May I send gifts to my child at Christmas. .. ?
A .. . . .
When we receive your monetary gift, it is placed into a special birthday, Easter
or Christmas fund along with gifts from other individual sponsors. This way
your child, and all our children, will receive presents.
Id. at 8-9.
Christian Children's Fund. The 1990 Annual Report does not say specifically
whether or not donations are pooled. However, most of the services described are
educational, including adult education. Classroom, as opposed to one-on-one ed-
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tion to a direct donee, and they do it in a deductible way.
2. Direct Disbursements.-Two organizations, Compassion International, Inc. and Futures for Children, Inc., appear to disburse
funds directly to individual children. If they do, contributions to
these organizations should not be deductible. However, contributions
to both organizations are fully deductible.8 4
Futures for Children, Inc. is a child sponsorship organization,
similar to all the others except in one respect. An attachment to
their application to the IRS states that "[t]he annual contribution of
$240 is distributed as follows: 56.6% of it, or $136 per year, is paid
in a direct cash benefit to the sponsored child."'8 5
Compassion International, Inc. responded in a letter to this
ucation suggests pooling.
Save the Children Federation, Inc.
Save the Children believes in help. . .not handouts. So your contribution, combined with those of other sponsors, goes toward community projects and
services...
Cover Letter to information package (July 1990).
Q. How does Save the Children use my sponsorship contributions to help
children?
A. Because nearly 60 years of experience has taught us that direct handouts are
the least effective way of helping children, your sponsorship contributions are not
distributed in this way. Instead, combined with other sponsors', they are used to
help children in the most effective way possible-by helping the entire community with projects such as health care, education, food production and nutrition.
Pamphlet, Save the Children, What Sponsoring a Child Can Mean. . .to You and and a
Child Who Needs Your Help., at 6 (1990).
World Vision.
All childcare funds from sponsors are combined so that we may help unsponsored children in the community. Since the cost of living and rate of inflation
vary widely from country to country, combining sponsor funds also enables us to
provide the same quality of care to all of the children we are helping.
One page information sheet dated September 1987.
Submissions to IRS
Form 1023, Application of Exempt Status, for Save the Children Federation, Inc., in an attachment responding to question 10i, recites language from the organization's Certificate of
Incorporation (also attached to the Application) which recites, as a general purpose:
Initiating and helping to develop and operate programs for aid to children and
the general improvement of their family and community life, through service to
groups and individuals and through specific projects both in the United States
and overseas.
Form 1025 for Holy Land Mission, the predecessor of Children International, had no useful
information on the nature of their child sponsorship. However, their child sponsorship activities
prior to 1971, the year of the application, may have been considerably less significant than
they are now.
84. Compassion International, Inc.: IRS Form L-391 dated October 15,1973. Futures
for Children, Inc.: IRS Form L-178 dated March 8, 1978.
85. Futures for Children, Inc. Form 1023, August 29, 1977, Attachment 12 (emphasis
added).
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writer, "We have always earmarked contributions from specific
sponsors for the benefit of their own sponsored child.""6 The organization's magazine recently printed the following on a page headlined
"Compassion Believes in Providing Direct Benefits":
Compassion believes that when sponsors pay to support individual children, programs should result in direct benefits to
those children and their families.
Some development agencies consider child development too
narrow an approach to meeting a poor family's needs.
Compassion agrees that some problems affecting children
are best addressed at a broader level. Indeed, Compassion supports some activities affecting children's families and
communities.
In every case, however, sponsored children are the primary
intended beneficiaries of Compassion's development efforts.
"The community development approach has its merits, as it
helps families in other ways. The big difference is,that we truly
assist the child the sponsor has a picture of and receives letters
from," Stafford [Compassion Kenya country director] said.
"We have a greater impact on an individual and the family
rather than letting the help trickle down through community development," he said. "Christ had compassion for the masses, but
he helped them one at a time. In addition, we can assure a sponsor that we know the child and are caring for the child.""7
It seems reasonably clear that Futures for Children earmarks
contributions directly to individual children. The picture of Compassion International is considerably murkier, although it does appear
that they are trying hard to distinguish themselves from competing
organizations by suggesting that the others pool and they do not.
Under current law, if the inferences are correct, neither organization
should be allowed to receive deductible contributions.
Another interesting issue about Children International exists.
Its brochure answers the question, "What if I want to send a gift for
a special major project or need?" by stating:
Major gifts over $100 will be used in their entirety for the purpose intended-perhaps a bed, a major operation or other medical expenses, special dental work, eyeglasses, or help for the
86. Letter from M. Walter, Sponsor Relations, Compassion International to Joel Newman of 2/20191.
87. Pamphlet, Compassion International, Compassion Update, at 7 (January/February
1991).
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family such as putting a roof on their house, etc. When you send
a major gift, please write a note explaining the full intent of
your check so that we can be certain to carry out your wishes.88
The attorney for the organization writes:
It is Children International's policy to try to use these gifts for
the purposes intended by the donor, but the organization retains
ultimate control and responsibility for the use of the funds. Generally, the special gift is to meet a need that has been identified
by Children International and is consistent with its program
objectives.8 9
It is hard to reconcile the deductibility of these major gifts in
light of cases like Tilles.90
B.

Other Sponsorship Organizations

Sponsorship is not limited to children. Adopt-A-Whale is a good
example of a different type of sponsorship. According to their brochure, 9' for an annual donation of fifteen dollars, a contributor can
adopt a particular whale. The brochure furnishes a list of whales,
complete with descriptions of their appearance and personalities and
photographs of their tailsY2 "Adoption" means that the organization
will send regular reports about the sightings of the particular whale
adopted and other information concerning its welfare.9 a In addition,
information is provided about the welfare of all other whales being
monitored by the International Wildlife Coalition.9 4 The donor also
receives an adoption certificate. 5
There is no indication in the brochure that the annual contribution is in any way earmarked for the adopted whale. In fact, it appears much more likely that the money goes to the general charitable work of the organization. However, the organization does work
for the welfare of whales, including the ones listed for adoption.
Thus, contributors know that their contributions are, at least to some
extent, going to the benefit of a particular adopted whale. Again,
88. Pamphlet, Children International, Sponsorship: A Special Kind of Love, at 9-10
(rev, November 1989).
89. Letter from Thomas R. Willy to Joel Newman of 1/24/91.
90, See supra notes 16-19.
91. Materials mailed to Joel Newman from Whale Adoption Project, International
Wildlife Coalition, May 1991 (on file at Dickinson Law Review office).
92. Pamphlet, Whale Adoption list.
93. Pamphlet, Whale Adoption Project, at 4.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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these contributions are fully deductible."6
The Encyclopedia of Associations97 reveals that there are a
number of organizations with names that begin with Adopt. The
most intriguing is Adopt-a-Cow, which was a short-lived organization involved in the effort to help farmers afflicted by drought. 98 At
any rate, the number of these organizations attests to the success of
the marketing principle that charitable contributions are more pleasant if they are supposedly directed toward a specific, known, needy
individual, human or not.
IV.

Two Proposals for Direct Contributions

All of the sponsorship organizations described above should be
allowed to receive fully deductible contributions. If current law
would deny that deductibility in some cases, then current law should
be changed. All of these arrangements are demonstrably successful
at making charitable giving pleasurable, and none of them poses any
legitimate concern to the government. Congress would be well advised to amend the law to make direct contributions through sponsorship agencies clearly deductible. Two possible proposals would
give Congress the means to make the contributions deductible.
A.

Proposal One

Proposal One involves giving the congressional imprimatur to
what is apparently being done already by some child sponsorship
agencies. The organization selects a slate of deserving donees. The
donor then chooses one and sends a contribution to the organization.
The organization either disburses the money directly to the donee, or
spends it for the donee's benefit.
B.

Proposal Two

The charitable organization would do nothing other than to investigate and certify deserving individual donees. Donors could then
give direct, deductible contributions to them. Perhaps each certified
96. One might argue that the contributions were actually used to purchase the service of
having the travels of a particular whale monitored for the benefit of a contributor. Therefore,
there would be a corresponding quid pro quo and no deductible contribution. It is doubtful that
this argument would succeed with Adopt-a-Whale, though it might come closer to the mark
when one pays a set sum to an organization to plant a particular tree in a particular place,
even if that place was public land.
97. Encyclopedia of Associations (D. Burek, ed., 25th ed.) (.1991).
98. Telephone Interview with P. Miller, paralegal for Rep. Mike Rose, concerning the
Farmer Assistance Relief Mission (January 3, 1991).
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donee could be given special receipts. Contributions to individuals
would be deductible only if those receipts were attached to the tax
return.
C. Advantages and Disadvantages of Each Proposal
In Proposal One, the organization protects both the government
and the donor from fraud by conducting careful investigations to
make sure that its slate of donees is truly in need. Also, the organization can monitor the donor's behavior to make sure that the donor
spends the money wisely. Further, the organization could ensure, if it
were considered necessary, that the donor and donee were not too
closely related. Finally, the organization, by pairing up one donor
with a donee and monitoring the donations, could ensure that no one
donee received more than he or she needed for the exempt function.
The government would have no more of a burden than it presently
does. Once it had assured itself that the organization was bona fide,
it could then leave all further monitoring efforts to the organization.
Proposal Two would also protect both government and donors
from fraud, with no administrative burden on the government. It
would have two advantages over Proposal One. First, it would allow
the most direct contact between donor and donee. Donors would
have the pleasure of handing over the check or cash directly to the
certified object of their bounty.
Second, Proposal Two would be more flexible. Consider the following cases:
The contribution that gave me the most satisfaction was one to
the wife of a truck driver who was killed the day before. I gave
everything I had on me and I got the rest of the guys to pitch in.
There was a case of personal need. It never could have been
handled through an organization in time.99
In April, 1954, Tom Barnhard, a Greenwich Village janitor,
committed suicide in despair and left a sick widow. [Comedian
Jackie] Gleason read the story, blew his nose, picked up the
phone, and called the News. "Pal," he said, "I want to pick up
the tab for that funeral." He did.""0
To apply Proposal One to either case, the donees would have to
be investigated, and a sponsor would have to be found. Finding the
99. Statement of Sam Eckman, in F. EMERSON ANDREWS,
118 (1953).
100. JIM BIsHoP, THE GOLDEN HAM 21-22 (1956).
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right sponsor would take time. Multiple donors, each giving a small
amount, would be quicker. Under Proposal Two, the charitable organization would merely conduct its investigation. Then, all contributions would be deductible. This form of giving harks back to the
American pioneer traditions when neighbors worked together to help
the one in need. This fine tradition should be encouraged.
Proposal Two, however, does have three possible disadvantages.
First, monitoring the relationship of the donor and the donee may be
impossible. Second, the proposal could lead to a resurgence of begging. Third, some donees might receive too much while others receive too little.
1. Must Donor-Donee Relationships Be Monitored?.-Under
Proposal Two, once an organization certifies a donee, it would have
no control over who contributed to that donee. Therefore, donors and
donees might have prior relationships. The nature of this problem
depends upon the nature of the relationships.
a. Parents and Children.-It is very important that parents
be prohibited from making deductible contributions to their minor
children. First, a deduction for such contributions would be the most
likely to be inefficient because these contributions would probably be
made even if the deduction was not available. In fact, parents are
legally obligated to support their minor children. Second, these contributions are already given tax recognition through the dependency
exemption.' No further deduction is needed.
However, even under Proposal Two, the charitable organization
would have to certify that the individual donee was an appropriate
charitable beneficiary. It would be highly unlikely for such an initial
certification to be made were the donee's parents capable of making
10 2
tax deductible contributions on the donee's behalf.
b. Relatives and Friends.-ProposalTwo would furnish no
protection against contributions from other relatives or friends,
101. I.R.C. §§ 151, 152.
102. However, if the charitable activity were something other than support for financially needy individuals, there would be a problem. For example, assume that a charitable
organization gives scholarships to talented musicians, regardless of financial need. Such an
organization could certify a financially independent musician as a deserving donee. Then, that
donee's parents could transfer funds to her and take a charitable contribution deduction. Perhaps donees certified for reasons other than financial need would have to promise to use the
funds only for the charitable purpose. Alternatively, there could be 2.cap placed on the amount
of any one deductible contribution, and an overall cap as well. Each year, total donations could
be computed. If the overall cap had been exceeded, then the donee would lose her certification
for the future.
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Should this be a cause for concern? It seems likely that relatives and
friends, as a group, do not make such contributions now, but would
be the most likely to do so if given more encouragement. Therefore,
allowing for the deductibility of such contributions would not be
inefficient. In fact, it would be highly effective.
c. Unrelated Donors.-Imagine the two scenarios under
Proposal Two. First, two certified donees approach a potential donor
and solicit a contribution. The donor states that she is willing to give
money to one of them and invites each one to offer arguments why
he, and not the other, should receive the contribution. The first donee
describes his or her need in detail. The second donee offers to mow
the donor's lawn. Donor gives the contribution to the second donee,
who mows donor's lawn and gives the donor a charitable contribution receipt.
Second, imagine that two individuals approach a homeowner
and offer to mow her lawn. The first merely offers to do a good job.
The second states that he or she is a certified charitable donee and
offers to give the homeowner a receipt so that homeowner can deduct
the cost of the lawnmowing as a charitable contribution. The homeowner chooses the second individual and takes the deduction.
Payments for lawnmowing services are not charitable contributions, even when the recipient of the payment is in need. If the facts
of the two scenarios were to emerge as above, there would be no
deduction. However, under Proposal Two, it would be difficult to
catch people engaged in schemes like these.
2. Begging.-Proposal Two would make contributions to beggars tax deductible. Of course, all individuals would have to be certified, so that the possibilities for fraud or wasted contributions would
be minimized. However, some would have aesthetic concerns. Of
course, such contributors would still have the option of contributing
to charitable organizations.
3. Too Many Contributions.-UnderProposal Two, it would
be possible for some donees to receive more contributions than they
needed, while other needy donees received little or nothing. The
charitable organization could attempt to alleviate this problem by
conducting follow-up investigations of its donees and decertifying
those who were no longer in need. However, such investigations
would be difficult and burdensome. Of course, this problem is a
structural problem of the charitable marketplace. Even under cur-
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rent law, some charitable organizations might receive more contributions than they really need, and others may receive less.
D.

A Choice

Proposal Two is tempting in that it offers flexibility and direct
donations. However, its disadvantages, especially the possibilities for
the fraudulent disguise of payments for services rendered as contributions, outweigh its advantages. Thus, only Proposal One is
recommended.
V.

Conclusion

If we are to encourage certain behavior, we ought to encourage
that form of the behavior which is most likely to be performed. If we
truly want to encourage charitable giving, we should encourage charitable giving to individuals, even friends. An expanded deductibility
of earmarked contributions from sponsorship organizations would increase charitable giving without any of the disadvantages that have
given us pause in the past. Proposal One should be certified by Congress as fully deserving of deductible contributions.

